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Paul Johnson begins his inquiry into the ethics of letting defective
infants die by rejecting the position of Joseph Fletcher that they may
not, in some instances, be humans at all. In his well-known pieces on
"indicators of humanhood " Fletcher has offered a checklist of qualities one might require of a being for him /h er /it to qualify (and be
protected) as a human: e.g., neo-cortical function, curiosity , a sense of
time, self-awareness. Minimal intelligence, for instance, would be
demanded: "Any individual of the species homo sapiens who falls
below the I.Q. 40-mark in a standard Stanford-Binet test, amplified if
you like by other tests, is questionably a person; below the 20-mark,
not a person . Homo is indeed sapiens, in order to be homo. "1 Johnson
disagrees. The question, he says, is not whether defective newborns are
human children; all live progeny of women and men must be human.
The question is, rather, what their relative value as humans might be.
I shall be arguing that the position Johnson takes is considerably
more savage even than the barbarities Fletcher espouses.
To reckon the value of a given infant's life, Johnson explains , we
must estimate the quality, realized or potential, that this life possesses.
A child's value is related to the degree to which he or she can be
expected to attain those higher fun ctions which are most characteristic of human personhood and which distinguish humans from lower
species of animal life. Since the purpose of human life is not merely
biological existence, not simply to m etabo lize, we must calculate it as
valuable to the extent that it attains higher goods, by being actively
and fruitfully inter-personal. Relying on Richard McCormick, the distinguished Jesuit moralist, Johnson argues that it is an ability to relate
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to other humans which is the essential and validating activity for
human persons. "McCormick places special emphasis on relational
potential. Life is a good insofar as it affords access to higher goods, in
particular to the goods of social relatedness and relationship to the
transcendent through relationship to neighbor. Thus, this relational
potential would be the touchstone of quality of life jUdgments.
McCormick argues, 'It is neither inhuman nor unchristian to say that
there comes a point where an individual's condition itself represents
the negation of any truly human -i.e., relational-potential . . .. When
in human judgment this potential is totally absent or would be, because
of the condition of the individual, totally subordinated to the mere
effort for survival, that life can be said to have achieved its potential.' "
The problem faced by parents, physicians, public servants and the
ethicists who advise them is that the resources and attention needed
for the survival of infants can vary greatly. Some seriously defective or
damaged or diseased children need therapeutic care well beyond the
means of most families, thus bringing a private need into the jurisdiction of public policy. Are we ethically obliged to nurture every infant,
whatever the cost, whatever the benefit? Fletcher would relieve us of
some burden by declaring some of the most crippled infants to be
non-humans. Johnson is anxious to find some way , while insisting that
all newborn children are humans, to assess their claims on our care
according to some reasonable scale.
He begins by stipulating that all humans have value, and follows this
with assurances that we should treat an infant with a "preference for
its protection," and that this "bias toward life" should give a newborn
the benefit of the doubt when we are deliberating whether he or she
should live or be let die. What this seems to mean is that the burden of
proof lies, not with the child struggling to live, but with anyone disposed to decide it should die. While this "bias toward life" is perhaps
not so ardent that any of us would confidently entrust our own life or
health to a medical staff so mildly motivated , it is difficult to quarrel
with those who assert at the outset that all human life has value. Yet
that is exactly where one needs to take issue, for there is a lethal error
at the very threshold of this argument.
So many things can be valuable to us: a week's holiday from work,
a loving parent, a collection of books, a garden with lawn and flowers,
strong athletic dexterity, a fine education, a full head of hair, a true
friend, shoes that do not leak, a symphony concert, an air conditioner.
Even social institutions like the state deal in many varied valuables: a
' park system, peace between nations, secure retirement benefits, prenatal care, stable banking, clean waterways, reliable pharmaceuticals.
The thing about valuable things is that they have such different values.
No;t only are they unequal; they are sometimes incommensurable.
Ho'w compare the value of a faithful , loving husband to that of a legal
career . .. or of a second car in the garage? How assess the relative
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values of full employment and of better railway roadbeds? Or the
relative disvalues of juvenile, drug-related crime and a soybean crop
failure? How compare the incomparable? Yet we do this all the time,
as anyone knows who has deliberated whether to move the family in
order to secure a professional promotion, or has sat long on a budget
committee.
Dealing with Values
When we deal in values we are treating of "lesser" and "greater"
and "different." And yet we can choose among them. It is said that
every thing has its price, and that every person can be bought. But the
fundamental measure of value is neither money, nor the work that
money represents, nor the portion of our life and time and energy
given to the work. The basic measure of our value is our own self: how
much do I value this thing, this opportunity, this person? What other
valued things am I willing to give for it, for her, for him? The medium
of barter among valuable things may not always be money, but they
all can be and are traded off against one another.
What I mean when I accord you value is that you have a worth for
me. Other humans are valued insofar as they serve needs or wants. We
possess a calculus whereby to reckon who is worth what. To the scale
of other persons' needs I can apply the scale of my own resources, and
also the scale of how generously I would yield the resources to meet
others' needs, according to how valuable those persons are to me.
The Johnson-McCormick argument on selective withholding of
treatment from defective newborn children appears to pivot around
what value such treatment might have for the infants themselves. But
a close examination of this value-theory discloses that the pivotal
value is not internal to the lives and interests of the infants, but what
value those children have to others.
Let me try to illustrate this first by comparisons. A short while ago
a young orderly in a Swedish home for the elderly was accused of
killing a dozen or more of the residents by offering them carbonated
drinks laced with corrosive acid. These old people, he later explained,
were leading meaningless lives. What did this "meaningless" mean?
Was the young man stating that, in his judgment, the relational potential of these old people was now totally used up, or that it had become
totally subordinated to the mere effort for survival? Or was he saying
simply that they were now more trouble than they were worth? Whatever his drift, he was making a life-and-death judgment that appears to
involve three variables: how much care the old people required; how
much relational or spiritual activity so much care would make possible, and how dear these persons were to him. For himself as a staffer,
or for the Swedish public whose interests he decided to assert, there
seemed to be no adequately "meaningful" outcome from institutional
care. The old folks' lives may have had some fundamental value, but
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now no longer enough value to justify continued care. Now, although
his statement may appear to have considered the matter from the
standpoint and interests of the old men and women, the decisive
variable was related, not to them (how much meaningful outcome),
but to himself and the public he claimed to represent (how meaningful
it was having them around to care for). The measure of meaning was
not the victims, but the one who sent them to their deaths.
One remembers similar applications of this value-theory. The
orderly's judgment about "meaningful life" put me in mind of the
Nazi formula, lebensunwertes Leben (life not worth living), which was
frequently used when the Third Reich had recourse to judgments of
relative value on human lives. The Slavs, they decided, were Untermenschen, sub-humans fit only for slave labor. Well below them on
the value scale were Gypsies and, lower still, Jews, the bacilli of
society. Values at this lowest level were finely calculated. There were
Jews, and Mischlinge (cross-breeds) first-class, and Mischlinge secondclass. These categories could be subdivided into "productive" and
"non-productive." Bolshevik commissars in the Soviet army were also
quite unvaluable, as were other " useless eaters" and "anti-socials":
mental patients, the enfeebled elderly, unrecoverably wounded soldiers, "racially valueless children" and, to come full circle to what we
are presently considering, defective newborn children (the very first of
all these categories for whom Hitler approved an extermination order) .
It cannot be said that the Nazis assigned no value to human life . Their
programs were grounded precisely on an elaborate scale of values. At
its base the value system was quite simple. As Hitler once explained to
a gathering of general officers, he decided upon the "removal of the
Jews from our nation, not because we would begrudge them their
existence - we congratulate the rest of the world on their companybut because the existence of our own nation is a thousand times more
important to us than that of an alien race." 2
A few decades earlier, liberal reformers in England had been proposing and legislating social policies that, in their way, were also valueresponsive . "It was, to illustrate, the law of the land that upon certification of any two doctors, any person might be incarcerated indefinitely for feeblemindedness . Charles Wicksteed Armstrong was saying: 'the nation which first begins to breed for efficiency - denying
the right of the scum to beget millions of their kind ... is the nation
destined to rule the earth .... To diminish the dangerous fertility of
the unfit there are three methods : the lethal chamber, segregation and
sterilization.' The professor of eugenics at London University was proposing that paupers, tramps, and the insane be left to starve; otherwise
the fertile but unfit would continue to reproduce and prevent England
from continuing as a world power. A physician with governmental
authority who was concerned with mental deficiency tested his theory
that it was due to small skulls by operating on children's heads; a
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fourth of them died. When the National Insurance Act required compulsory contributions from all workers, it provided that workmen
could be denied unemployment compensation if they had been discharged for misconduct - insolence, for example. Pensions were withheld from those who had been in prison or had 'persistently failed to
work.' "3
Assigning a Variable Value
When one is prepared to assign a variable value to other human
beings according as they are expected to rise to a high level of social
performance, and then to allot to them a corresponding measure of
life's sustenance, this is no ethical refinement. It is the same old business of the runt of the litter getting pushed away from the teat. All
too often when we apologize that it would be too unkind to make
some creature face so unsatisfying an existence, what we really mean
is that we don't want to pay his or her bills.
By evaluating human beings insofar as they are "relational, " or by
"what they can come to be," or by their "personal or social consciousness," their "quality of life," their " access to higher goods," their
potential for attaining a "truly human life," we assign to our fellows a
value measured by their active participation in our society. The ideally
valuable, "truly human life" at its best appears to belong to a taxpaying adult who earns a living. To the extent that one falls short of
this ideal, by infancy or senility or criminality or retardation or
infirmity, one slips down the value scale. Behind all this calculation
lurks a readiness to appraise others according as they are pleasant or
congenial or contributory towards ourselves, and then to act on this
appraisal.
I discern two ethical impediments here. First, in this business of
applied values , one appears to be considering three distinct factors:
how much this other person needs (burden on the benefactor), how
much good it would do this person if helped (benefit to the beneficiary), and how dear this other person is to me (relationship of
beneficiary to benefactor). The interplay of all these factors would
seem to promise a fair judgment. I must consider how much claim on
my own life and resources is being made, how much proportionate
gain this will bring my neighbor, and how dear to me my neighbor is
or how beholden or bound to him or her I am . But when one calculates the anticipated benefits to the other person by that person's
anticipated social response, then the factor supposedly respecting my
neighbor's welfare is turned around and becomes, in effect, an indicator of how pleasant it is to have that person around. The benefits
anticipated are measured, °not intrinsically with respect to him or her,
but extrinsically with respect to myself and others who stand to gain
from a grudging judgment. The calculation is no longer an interplay of
interests ; it is put entirely at the pleasure of the one in power. The
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neighbor and the neighbor's future are cast into dependence on how
useful I reckon him to be .t o the rest of us. So when H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. wants to relieve some infant of the "injury of continued
existence" or SS Gruppenfuhrer Prof. Karl Brandt describes the elimination of "useless eaters" and "undesirable individuals" as an "act of
grace," I suspect that this is an injury I should pray for and a grace I
should shun. This concern for "quality of life" is a self-concern bearing the likeness of other-concern.
The second ethical impediment is raised by the readiness to treat
persons according as it would be valuable for them. I do not wish to
question the way in which persons are evaluated. Quite clearly others
are more or less valuable according as they become socially valuable,
or as they realize their "relational potential." What I would dispute is
that we have any ethical warrant to make this value the first basis for
our treatment of others.
Let me suggest another way of approach. Rather than designating
all human life as valuable, I would propose that all human beings are
not valuable. They are invaluable. Our fellow humans are not merely
the most valuable things around; they are off the scale, truly incommensurable, not even to be introduced into the rate of exchange
whereby we convert the relative values of other things. A human being
can be valued, as has been described. But a human being ought also,
and more importantly and fundamentally, be reverenced. Possibly this
would support the way some folks have of calling life sacred: not
because of any necessary relationship to God, but because it seems an
appropriate category in which to shelter those very precious beings of
transcendent goodness . As -Simen- Peter- explaine-ct-1;o-Simon- Magtts;
ther-e--afe-se ·me-t.R-iags-t-ee- valti-a-l71e-tO--hav.e a price. The governing
insight in this assertion that human persons are beyond value -legitimate without recourse to religious premises - is that mankind is
obliged, if they are to live and grow in spirit, to deal with others not
simply according to what good it may produce, what use it serves,
what response it subsidizes.
Corrupted Morally, Destroyed Spiritually
We are corrupted morally and destroyed spiritually if we treat
others only as they are valuable. We have of course only limited goods
and service to dispose of, and fellow humans whose needs and claims
far exceed our wherewithal. In matching our resources to their needs
we are presented with a most rudimentary moral option: whether to
exert ourselves to meet those endless neighbor-needs, or whether to
adjudicate those needs and claims to serve our pleasure by calculating
their social benefit potential. There is obviously no congruence or
conformity between the invaluable persons we confront and the valuebenefits we might afford them. But there is a telltale and deep-cleft
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difference whether they are the measure of our lives or we the
measure of theirs.
This is not, as I say, a religious position, though it might be. The
injunction that mankind is to be provided for, from each according to
means and to each according to need (an injunction more gracious
than all this calculation of values), may be ascribed either to first
century Jerusalem Christians or 19th century Russian-German
atheists. Both were of the mind that it is not enough to run a costbenefit analysis on one's neighbor (though that is exactly what most
Communist powers and some Christian institutions are now doing). In
any case, what I know of Christian faith reinforces the conviction that
no follower of Jesus, holding in his or her hand the powers of life and
death over those less advantaged, should begin to wield such powers
by asking how much social yield there will be from any given material
investment. We owe things of value to persons beyond value. Indeed,
we live by a belief that it is the least able, the least forthcoming who
have strongest claim on our lives and substance.
One is often reminded that, whatever our disposition to treat our
fellows as invaluable, there are still certain situations in which it is
both allowable and dutiful to appraise others in a strictly utilitarian
way. Triage is the typical situation put forward. At a field hospital in a
combat zone, battle will produce casualties that swamp the capacity
of the hospital. It becomes an inexorable fact that some must be saved
and some left to die. A triage officer stands at the entry, sorting
casualties so that the medical facility can accomplish the most practical good. One soldier disastrously wounded has to be set aside in
favor of five others who, in the same amount of time, can have their
lives saved. The battalion commander is sent in and the assistant cook
held back. Officers have priority over enlisted men. Enemy wounded
are given last place after one's own comrades whose survival will help
the war effort. Faced with life-and-death needs and inadequate
resources, the triage officer does his duty precisely by being ruthlessly
utilitarian. The wounded are evacuated; they are treated in accordance with their value to the group and to the struggle. People are sent
for saving treatment or are left to die on grounds of the payoff a given
amount of care will produce.
About triage as a paradigm of ethical choice I would make several
observations . First, even when it seems quite justified, it has a way of
consuming a person. For a doctor, the fibers of whose self are braided
into lifelines of generous concern, it snarls the soul, not simply to lose
a patient to death, but to mark him or her for death. It may require
uncommonly high and durable virtue to perform this task without
making a vice out of necessity. To illustrate: during the Holocaust,
certain Jewish community leaders, after agonizing at the Nazi order,
consented to select numbers of their own communities to be sent to
their destruction, in the hope that some others - the right others-
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might be spared. One such Alteste, leader of the ghetto in Lodz,
Poland, explained: "Now, when we are d eporting 10,000 people from
the ghetto, I cannot pass over this tragic subject in silence. Unfortunately, in this respect, I received a ruthless order, an order which I
had to carry out in order to prevent its being carried out by others.
Within the framework of my possibilities . .. I have tried to mitigate
the severity of the decree. I have settled the matter so that I assigned
for deportation that portion which was for the ghetto a suppurating
abscess. So the list included the ousted operators of the underground,
scum, and all sorts of persons harmful to the ghetto." 4 Another in
Upper Silesia argued that the Jews should accept from the Gestapo the
onus of selecting the contingents for extermination, so as to preserve
for the community its most helpful elements. First to go, on his lists,
were informers, thieves, and "undesirables"; next went the insane, the
sick, and the defective children. 5 The victims had , by acquiescing in
the work, somehow been contaminated by the minds of the oppressors.
Even when necessity seems to call for it, can a person long deal with
his or her neighbors in this way, calculating their "worth to society,"
their relational potential, without soon acquiring the perverse habit of
mind which one wants to resist but perhaps cannot?
Triage Easily Invoked
Another thing about triage: it is so easily invoked. A few years back
one had to decide which patients could have use of the few kidney
dialysis machines and which could not. There was much evaluating
then. And there could be little argument, and little misgiving, for there
simply were no more machines to be had. But in a world where
medical resources are never likely to satisfy medical needs, is not every
day one of triage? Are not all medical practitioners who administer
life and death likely to calculate the relative value of their patients?
And will this reckoning not be heavily influenced by what this treatment, what this survival would mean to them, the medics? It goes far
beyond m~dicine. Johnson reminds us of "the competition for scarce
monetary and manpower resources in society," and Garret Hardin is
arguing from that that the United States had better leave the poorer
nations to starve if it wants to preserve the good life .
A recent newspaper canvass of citizen comment on the "boat
people" from Southeast Asia who were frantically seeking asylum
elicited a wave of hostile statements from Americans who insisted that
our country could not harbor endless waves of feckless refugees.
Knowing the devastation the United States has visited upon the homelands of these people, and that their predecessors have been some of
America's most industrious and self-reliant immigrants, and that our
country enjoys such relative abundance among the nations of the
earth, what is one to think of these claims that a welcome for these
refugees would be wasted? Why is it that the powerful and affluent
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and engorged of this world are always the most aware that there is not
enough to go around and that there are so many people who will make
poor use of what is given them?
And as for the necessity that imposes triage on us: granted the
battle, it may be justified to pick some wounded to die because they
are less worthwhile. But why grant the battle in the first place?
Granted the inadequacy of medical care in poor communities, some
people must be left to ail and to die who might otherwise be saved.
But why grant the inadequacy? So often we consent to participate in
what we lament as "tragic" decisions that cost other people their lives
or well-being without challenging the social injustice that has imposed
the tragedy. One is reminded of a proposal submitted to Adolf Eichmann: "There is an imminent danger that not all the Jews can be
supplied with food in the coming winter. We must seriously consider if
it would not be more humane to finish off the Jews, insofar as they
are not fit for labor mobilization, with some quick-acting means. In
any case this would be more agreeable than to let them die of
hunger." 6 There is no triage when the same people who offer humane
death are the ones who cause the imminent danger. And so it often is.
There is, behind this application of value-theory, the possibility of
great mischief (though I see Johnson and McCormick as willing parties
to none of it). This can be seen perhaps by considering the canon
drawn up at the conference at the University of California, San Francisco: "Life-preserving intervention should be understood as doing
harm to an infant who cannot survive infancy .... " Compare this to
the medical experience in Holland during the Second World War.
"When Seiss-Inquart, Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands
Territories, wanted to draw the Dutch physicians into the orbit of the
activities of the German medical profession, he did not tell them 'You
must send your chronic patients to the death factories' or 'You must
give lethal injections at Government request in your offices,' but he
couched his order in most careful and superficially acceptable terms.
One of the paragraphs in the order of the Reich Commissar of the
Netherlands Territories concerning the Netherlands doctors of 19
December 1941 reads as follows: 'It is the duty of the doctor, through
advice and effort, conscientiously and to his best ability, to assist as
helper the person entrusted to his care in the maintenance, improvement and re-establishment of his vitality, physical efficiency and
health. The accomplishment of this duty is a public task.' The physicians of Holland rejected this order unanimously because they saw
what it actually meant - namely, the concentration of their efforts on
mere rehabilitation of the sick for useful labor, and abolition of medical secrecy. Although on the surface the new order appeared not too
grossly unacceptable, the Dutch physicians decided that it is the first,
although slight, step away from principle that is the most important
one. The Dutch physicians declared that they would not obey this
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order. When Seiss-Inquart threatened them with revocation of their
licenses, they returned their licenses, removed their shingles and, while
seeing their own patients secretly, no longer wrote death or birth
certificates. Seiss-Inquart retraced his steps and tried to cajole them still to no effect. Then he arrested 100 Dutch physicians and sent
them to concentration camps. The medical profession remained
adamant and quietly took care of their widows and orphans, but
would not give in. Thus it came about that not a single euthanasia or
non-therapeutic sterilization was recommended or participated in by
any Dutch physician." 7
Truly human, relational potential was the guiding star over San
Francisco. In Holland they seem to have held - with costly stubbornness - that as doctors they would often have to tend patients who
could never be cured. They knew their job was not to produce a
healthy, working population, nor to eliminate the stunted; it was their
profession to heal whom they could, alleviate the affliction of those
they could not, and stand by all whom they served. They would have
agreed with Johnson that death is not the ultimate enemy (though
perhaps abandonment is). Their dedication, though, would be not to
human life, as Johnson would say, but to human beings whose lives we
heal if we can, but still serve if we cannot.
Does it follow that all defective infants must, because reverenced as
our invaluable human comrades, be given every available medical treatment, no matter what the cost? I am not arguing that this must
necessarily follow. What I am asking is that the issue be remanded
for further and different consideration. One would require that when
parents, physicians and statesmen look into a crib to ask themselves
whether it be right to let death claim a blighted child, they not consider what measure of potential the infant has to become truly human.
For their purposes, that stunted, afflicted fellow human of theirs is
already as invaluably valuable as he or she ever will or would be, and is
far more dependent on them than are most children for the protection
of its person and its life.
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